The Court had to consider two questions. First: Can the executive branch unilaterally declare people to be enemy combatants and hold them indefinitely? And, second: did Hamdi have the right to have his case heard by a neutral decision maker? The Courts decision was a plurality-justices disagreed on important issues and there was no majority. Therefore, the government had the power to detain him as long as the war continued.
But the Court also held that citizens-including enemy combatants-do have rights of due process. Hamdi agreed to renounce his American citizenship and worked out a plea agreement in which he was returned to Saudi Arabia. How did the Supreme Court rule? Justice Antonin Scalia believed the Constitution offered only two options to the government for detaining Hamdi: for Congress to exercise its power to suspend habeas corpus , or to try him in the criminal court system.
Do you agree? The majority opinion said war was not "a blank check" for the executive branch and that "an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat. The agreement to release Hamdi, negotiated over the last four months, precluded any such hearing. Hamdi was supposed to be released by September 30, but the departure was delayed while U. Attorneys for two other enemy combatants -- so-called "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla and Qatari national Ali Saleh al-Marri -- are currently challenging their detentions in a South Carolina federal court.
Both are being held in the Charleston brig. He would not give specifics on his treatment during his time in U. Hamdi did allude to solitary confinement when he said prayer helped him during long days alone. Hamdi voices innocence, joy about reunion Man held as 'enemy combatant' now back in Saudi Arabia Hamdi said his new freedom "feels great.
Former U. Saudi Arabia. Yaser Hamdi. Manage alerts What is this? House votes to keep U. It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities. Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite or perpetual detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.
If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. In that case, the Court made repeated reference to the fact that its inquiry into whether the military tribunal had jurisdiction to try and punish Milligan turned in large part on the fact that Milligan was not a prisoner of war, but a resident of Indiana arrested while at home there.
That fact was central to its conclusion. Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the holding of the Court might well have been different.
Quirin was a unanimous opinion. It both postdates and clarifies Milligan , providing us with the most apposite precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens may be detained in such circumstances.
Brushing aside such precedent—particularly when doing so gives rise to a host of new questions never dealt with by this Court—is unjustified and unwise Even in cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status.
Though they reach radically different conclusions on the process that ought to attend the present proceeding, the parties begin on common ground. All agree that, absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States. Only in the rarest of circumstances has Congress seen fit to suspend the writ.
At all other times, it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law. All agree suspension of the writ has not occurred here The Government recognizes the basic procedural protections required by the habeas statute, but asks us to hold that, given both the flexibility of the habeas mechanism and the circumstances presented in this case, the presentation of the Mobbs Declaration to the habeas court completed the required factual development.
It suggests two separate reasons for its position that no further process is due. This argument is easily rejected. Hamdi resided in Afghanistan. This is the argument that further factual exploration is unwarranted and inappropriate in light of the extraordinary constitutional interests at stake.
Both of these positions highlight legitimate concerns. And both emphasize the tension that often exists between the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a constitutional right.
Eldridge It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case. Eldridge analysis is unaltered by the allegations surrounding the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is alleged to have associated. On the other side of the scale are the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.
As discussed above, the law of war and the realities of combat may render such detentions both necessary and appropriate, and our due process analysis need not blink at those realities. Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them.
The Government also argues at some length that its interests in reducing the process available to alleged enemy combatants are heightened by the practical difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like process. In its view, military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away, and discovery into military operations would both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war.
Wikipedia: Hamdi v. Oyez: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld A brief summary of the case with links to the oral argument, briefs, and written opinion. Rumsfeld Briefs written arguments submitted to the court in this case.
Jurist: Hamdi Legal news archive. FindLaw: Hamdi v. Justia: Hamdi v. Legal Information Institute: Hamdi v. Google Directory: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld Links. Rumsfeld v. Padilla Wikipedia: Rumsfeld v. Jurist: Jose Padilla Legal news archive. Oyez: Rumsfeld v. Padilla A brief summary of the case with links to the oral argument, briefs, and written opinion. FindLaw: Rumsfeld v. Legal Information Institute: Rumsfeld v. Justia: Rumsfeld v. Bush Wikipedia: Rasul v. Oyez: Rasul v.
Bush A brief summary of the case with links to the oral argument, briefs, and written opinion. FindLaw: Rasul v. Legal Information Institute: Rasul v. Justia: Rasul v. Yahoo Directory: Rasul v. Bush Links. Authorization for Use of Military Force Wikipedia: Non-Detention Act Encyclopedia article. Citizens PDF file. Non-Detention Act of , 18 U. Rumsfeld , Rumsfeld v. Padilla , and Rasul v. Bush by legal scholar Ronald Dworkin. Article on the Hamdi decision. Stanford Law Review : Is suspension a political question?
Article on the suspension of habeas corpus. Duke Law Review : Hamdi v. Rumsfeld A commentary on the case. Scalia the Civil Libertarian? Daily Standard: Specter v. Alumni Volunteers The Boardroom Alumni. Curriculum Materials. Add Event. Main Menu Home.
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